Duke University v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.: The Court of Appeals Brings Ambiguity to the Interpretation of Prefessional Services by Taylor, Samuel M.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 69 | Number 6 Article 6
9-1-1991
Duke University v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co.: The Court of Appeals Brings Ambiguity to the
Interpretation of Prefessional Services
Samuel M. Taylor
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Samuel M. Taylor, Duke University v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.: The Court of Appeals Brings Ambiguity to the Interpretation of
Prefessional Services, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1644 (1991).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol69/iss6/6
Duke University v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.:
The Court of Appeals Brings Ambiguity to the Interpretation of
"Professional Services"
The extraordinary development of insurance, and its necessary adapta-
tion to the varying and complicated business relations of a progressive
age tax the utmost ability of the courts.... While we should protect
the companies against all unjust claims and enforce all reasonable reg-
ulations necessary for their protection, we must not forget that the pri-
mary object of all insurance is to insure. . . . We can not permit
insurance companies by unreasonable stipulations to evade the pay-
ment of such indemnity when justly due, and thus defeat the very ob-
ject of their existence.'
Over ninety years ago, the North Carolina Supreme Court, revealing more
than a hint of consternation about the increasing complexity of insurance con-
tracts, joined other American jurisdictions in concluding that ambiguous clauses
in contracts of insurance should be interpreted in favor of the insured. This
canon of construction, which since has proved inherently flexible in both appli-
cation and outcome, 2 has become a favorite of modem jurists dealing in the
complex and technical language of insurance contracts. 3
Most recently, the North Carolina Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of
strict construction in Duke University v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.4
to give narrow interpretation to a "professional services" exclusion in the gen-
eral liability insurance policy of a North Carolina hospital.5 This ruling places
North Carolina among a growing number of states giving narrow construction
to "professional services" exclusions. 6 This Note analyzes the court's holding in
Duke University and concludes that while the strict construction of professional
services exclusions is consistent with North Carolina courts' long term deference
to policyholders, the court's rationale creates a confusing area of overlap be-
tween general liability insurance policies and professional service insurance poli-
cies. The Note suggests that the court could have minimized this overlap by
1. Grabbs v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 125 N.C. 389, 399, 34 S.E. 503, 506 (1899).
2. See infra notes 41-61 and accompanying text.
3. 2 M. RHODES, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 15:74, at 334, 341 (rev. 2d ed.
1984). "The words, 'the contract is to be construed against the insurer' comprise the most familiar
expression in the reports of insurance cases." Id. at 334. For a list of cases applying the rule that
ambiguous language is to be construed against the insurer, see id. at 341 n.10.
4. 96 N.C. App. 635, 386 S.E.2d 762, disc. rev. denied, 326 N.C. 595, 393 S.E.2d 876 (1990).
5. Id. at 641, 386 S.E.2d at 766.
6. See, eg., Gulf Ins. Co. v. Gold Cross Ambulance Serv. Co., 327 F. Supp. 149, 154-55 (W.D.
Okla. 1971); Keepes v. Doctors Convalescent Center, Inc., 89 I1. App. 2d 36, 40, 231 N.E.2d 274,
276 (1967); American Casualty Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 479 So. 2d 577, 579 (La. App. 1985);
D'Antoni v. Sara Mayo Hosp., 144 So. 2d 643, 646-47 (La. App. 1962); Lady Beautiful, Inc. v.
Zurich Ins. Co., 16 Ohio Misc. 169, 172, 240 N.E.2d 894, 896 (1968). But see Ocean Accident &
Guarantee Corp. v. Herzberg's Inc., 100 F.2d 171, 173 (8th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 645
(1939); Antles v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 221 Cal. App. 2d 438, 443, 34 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511
(1963); Brockbank v. Travelers Ins. Co., 12 A.D.2d 691, 691, 207 N.Y.S.2d 723, 724 (1960), appeal
denied, 9 N.Y.2d 609, 172 N.E.2d 293, 210 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1961); Harris v. Fireman's Fund Indem.
Co., 42 Wash. 2d 655, 660-61, 257 P.2d 221, 227 (1953).
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considering the intent of the contracting parties and the economic considera-
tions driving insurance contracts. In particular, the Note submits that a proper
analysis would have considered that insurance policies are designed to classify
insureds according to commonality of risk, and that these classifications, when
successfully applied, serve the important public policy goal of placing the burden
of insuring a particular type of risk on those persons most able to protect against
it.
At issue in Duke University was a general liability insurance policy insuring
Duke University and Duke University Medical Center against claims of injury
arising from accidents on their premises.7 The policy specifically excluded
"claims arising out of the providing or failure to provide professional services"
in hospital operations.8 In June of 1986, an elderly patient at the Medical
Center's outpatient dialysis center was injured when attendants failed to stabilize
her dialysis chair as she attempted to rise after treatment.9 The patient later
died from injuries sustained in the fall and a wrongful death action ensued. 10 St.
Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, the underwriter of the university's
general liability policy, refused to defend the wrongful death action on grounds
that the claim was within the policy's professional services exclusion. 11 Follow-
ing settlement of the parent action, the university brought suit against the in-
surer to recover its costs. 12 The trial court ordered summary judgment for the
university and the insurer appealed. 13 The court of appeals unanimously
affirmed. 14
The interpretation of professional services exclusions in insurance policies
was an issue of first impression for North Carolina appellate courts. 15 The court
of appeals thus began its analysis of the exclusion clause by briefly reviewing
North Carolina's well-settled rules of construction for contracts of insurance.
Specifically, the court noted that "[p]rovisions which exclude liability coverage
are not favored ... and any ambiguities must be construed against the insurer
and in favor of the insured." 16
After quickly concluding that the claim at issue could not be excluded on
causal grounds alone,17 the court turned to the task of construing the term "pro-
7. Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 636, 386 S.E.2d at 763; see Record at 21, Duke University
(No. 8914SC33).
8. Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 637, 386 S.E.2d at 764; Record at 29.
9. Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 638, 386 S.E.2d at 764.
10. Id. at 636, 638, 386 S.E.2d at 763, 764; see Record at 4.
11. Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 636, 386 S.E.2d at 763.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 641, 386 S.E.2d. at 766.
15. Id. at 638, 386 S.E.2d at 764.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 638-39, 386 S.E.2d at 764. The exclusion clause provided that claims "arising out
of" professional services should be excluded. Id. at 638, 386 S.E.2d at 764. The court noted that the
"arising out of language" must be construed narrowly "to require that the excluded cause be the sole
proximate cause of the injury." Id. at 638-39, 386 S.E.2d at 764 (citing State Capital Ins. Co. v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 318 N.C. 534, 547, 350 S.E.2d 66, 74 (1986)). Thus the court held:
"[C]overage [in this case] is excluded only if any negligence with respect to assisting decedent out of
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fessional services." Two principles guided its inquiry. First, the court noted
that "a 'professional service' generally is defined as one arising out of a vocation
or occupation involving specialized knowledge or skills, and the skills are mental
as opposed to manual."18 Second, the court observed, acts or omissions should
be classified as professional services on the basis of the nature of the acts or
omissions themselves, rather than the "position of the person responsible for the
act or omission." 19 Applying these postulates and the rule that courts should
construe ambiguous policy exclusions in favor of the insured, the court con-
cluded that the actions at issue in Duke University could not be classified as
professional services for policy exclusion purposes.20 Professional service policy
exclusions, the court held, apply "only [to] those services for which professional
training is a prerequisite to performance. '2 1 Stabilizing the dialysis chair and
assisting the injured party required no special skill or training and thus could
not be viewed as falling within the professional services exclusion.22
The court was not persuaded by authorities from other jurisdictions that
had given professional service exclusions broader sweep. 23 Jurisdictions that
had so ruled, the court noted, "did not employ the strict rule of construction
against the insurer that we must follow in this case."'24 Further, the court held
that while its interpretation of the exclusion language implied that the same
claim might be insured under both professional malpractice policies and general
liability policies with professional service exclusions, this potential for overlap-
ping coverage would not affect its decision.25
The notion that insurance policy exclusions should be disfavored and nar-
rowly construed against the insurer is but one element in a group of construc-
tional principles North Carolina courts apply when interpreting contracts of
the chair was a providing [sic] or failure to provide professional services. In order to resolve this
issue, we must construe the term 'professional services.' " Id. at 639, 386 S.E.2d at 764.
18. Id. at 639, 386 S.E.2d at 765 (citing Smith v. Keator, 21 N.C. App. 102, 105-06, 203 SE.2d
411, 415, aff'd, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203, appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1043 (1974)); see infra
notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
19. Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 639, 386 S.E.2d at 765 (citing Gulf Ins. Co. v. Gold Cross
Ambulance Serv. Co., 327 F. Supp. 149, 152 (W.D. Okla. 1971)); see infra notes 88-89 and accompa-
nying text.
20. Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 641, 386 S.E.2d at 766.
21. Id.
22. Id. Further, the court concluded that:
"[a]lthough the dialysis chair was a specialized piece of equipment, the injury was not
related to any special function of the chair but merely resulted from the presence of casters
on the chair which enable it to be easily moved.... [N]o special training is required for a
person to know that a chair with casters may move when someone attempts to rise from
it."
Id.
23. See supra note 6.
24. Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 640, 386 S.E.2d at 765. Presumably the court was refer-
ring to the rule that "provisions which exclude liability coverage are not favored," id. at 638, 386
S.E.2d at 764, since virtually all jurisdictions employ the general rule of construction against the
insurer. See supra note 3. Even the rule disfavoring exclusions may not distinguish adequately many
of the holdings in jurisdictions that give broader interpretation to the exclusion language. See infra
note 37.




insurance. The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Maddox v. Colonial Life &
Accident Insurance Co., summed up these constructional rules:26
In interpreting the relevant provisions of [insurance policies], we
are guided by the general rule that in the construction of insurance
contracts, any ambiguity in the meaning of a particular provision will
be resolved in favor of the insured and against the insurance company.
Exclusions from and exceptions to undertakings by the company are
not favored, and are to be strictly construed to provide the coverage
which would otherwise be afforded by the policy. The various clauses
are to be harmoniously construed if possible, and every provision
given effect. An ambiguity exists where, in the opinion of the court,
the language of the policy is fairly and reasonably susceptible to either
of the constructions asserted by the parties.27
Three principles underlie this aggregated rule of construction. First, in constru-
ing ambiguous policy provisions, courts must favor the insured. 28 Second, ab-
sent ambiguity, courts must construe an insurance policy in accordance with its
express terms.29 Finally, ambiguous terms must be construed in harmony with
the express provisions of the policy. 30
Although frequently applied mechanically by modem courts, 3 1 there are
important theoretical underpinnings for the rule that insurance policies should
be construed in favor of the insured. As the quotation that opens this Note
suggests, North Carolina courts struggling with the rapid development of new
forms of insurance during the early twentieth century sought to protect rela-
tively unschooled laypersons ill-equipped to analyze and interpret their poli-
cies. 32 Although this rule is similar to the admonition contra proferentem,33 it
has independent policy justifications. As one court has pointed out, "[insurance
policies] are unipartite.... In general, the insured never sees the policy until
after he contracts and pays his premium, and he then most frequently receives it
from a distance, when it is too late for him to obtain explanations or
26. 303 N.C. 648, 280 S.E.2d 907 (1981) (six of seven justices concurring in the result but not in
the opinion), quoted with approval in Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 68 N.C. App. 184, 188,
314 S.E.2d 552, 554-55, disc. rev. denied, 311 N.C. 761, 321 S.E.2d 142 (1984).
27. Maddox, 303 N.C. at 650, 280 S.E.2d at 908 (citations omitted).
28. See infra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 41-61 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
31. See e.g., State Capital Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 318 N.C. 534, 541, 547, 350
S.E.2d 66, 70, 73-74 (1986); Waste Management, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 693-94, 340
S.E.2d 374, 378-79 (1986); Maddox v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 303 N.C. 648, 653-54, 280
S.E.2d 907, 910 (1981).
32. See, e.g., Roberts v. American Alliance Ins. Co., 212 N.C. 1, 4, 192 S.E. 873, 875 (1937);
East Carolina Ry. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 145 N.C. 114, 117, 58 S.E. 906, 907 (1907) (quoting
Bray v. Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 139 N.C. 390, 393, 51 S.E. 922, 923 (1905)).
33. See 2 M. RHODES, supra note 3, § 15:74, at 334, 341. The constructional principle ofcontra
proferentem suggests that "if language supplied by one party is reasonably susceptible to two inter-
pretations, one of which favors each party, the one that is less favorable to the party that supplied
the language is preferred." E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.11, at 518 (2d ed. 1990). The rule
frequently is applied in the construction of standard contracts and "often operates against a party
that is at a distinct advantage in bargaining." Id.
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modifications." '34
In contrast to the clearly articulated considerations supporting the general
rule of construction in favor of insureds, North Carolina courts adopted the
principle that exclusions are disfavored and thus strictly construed against the
insurer with virtually no independent explanation. The exclusion rule first was
applied in North Carolina in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Shelby Mutual Insurance
Co. 35 in 1967. Justice Lake, who wrote frequently for the court regarding insur-
ance matters, stated simply that "[e]xclusions from and exceptions to undertak-
ings by the company are not favored." 3 6 Presumably, the court considered this
unexplained statement an obvious corollary to the general rule that courts
should construe ambiguities in policies of insurance in favor of the insured.
Since exclusions by their very nature must diminish coverage, and hence disfa-
vor the insured, any ambiguity in such clauses necessarily would cause a court to
construe the limiting language narrowly.37 Additionally, the Allstate court may
well have concluded that policyholders unfamiliar with the structure and termi-
nology of insurance documents might overlook or misunderstand exclusion
clauses, and that disfavoring these exclusions would protect unsuspecting insur-
ance purchasers.38 Whatever rationale prompted the rule, it has found wide
34. Roberts, 212 N.C. at 4, 192 S.E. at 875.
35. 269 N.C. 341, 152 S.E.2d 436 (1967).
36. Id. at 346, 152 S.E.2d at 440. Nor do the authorities cited for the proposition explain why
exclusions should be disfavored beyond any other language purporting to define the nature and
extent of coverage. See Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 430, 435,
146 S.E.2d 410, 414 (1966); Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 309, 312, 145 S.E.2d 845, 848
(1966).
Whatever the reasons for disfavoring exclusions, courts have held that the burden of proving
facts within an exclusion rests with the insurer. See, ag., Brevard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
262 N.C. 458, 461, 137 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1964) ("In an action to recover under an insurance policy,
the burden is on the plaintiff to allege and prove coverage. On the other hand, the burden of show-
ing an exclusion from coverage in [sic] on the insurer."); Barclays American/Leasing, Inc. v. North
Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 99 N.C. App. 290, 294, 392 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1990); Reliance Ins. Co. v.
Morrison, 59 N.C. App. 524, 525, 297 S.E.2d 187, 188 (1982).
37. 2 M. RHODES, supra note 3, states simply: "In accord with general principles, policy excep-
tions are strictly construed and do not reduce the coverage beyond their express terms.... [A]ny
ambiguity in an exception clause is construed in favor of the insured." 2 M. RHODES, supra note 3,
§ 44A:3, at 7.
If this is the only theoretical justification for North Carolina courts' disfavoring of exclusions,
then it would seem there is really no reason to disfavor such clauses more than any other limitation
in coverage. If so, the Duke University court's attempt to distinguish jurisdictions that have con-
strued exclusions more broadly is seriously flawed. See Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 639.40,
386 S.E.2d at 765; supra note 24 and accompanying text. Each of the conflicting jurisdictions cited
by the court has well-developed rules requiring strict construction of ambiguous policy limitations.
See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hollender, 38 Cal. 2d 73, 81, 237 P.2d 510, 514 (1951); Tonkin v.
California Ins. Co., 294 N.Y. 326, 328-29, 62 N.E.2d 215, 216 (1945); Jack v. Standard Marine Ins.
Co., 33 Wash. 2d 265, 271, 205 P.2d 351, 354 (1949) (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. Continental
Life Ins. Co., 159 Wash. 683, 688, 294 P. 585, 587 (1930)).
38. This supposition is supported by rather colorful language used by Justice Lake in James-
town Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 430, 146 S.E.2d 410 (1966):
When an insurance company, in drafting its policy of insurance, uses a "slippery"
word to mark out and designate those who are insured by the policy, it is not the function
of the court to sprinkle sand upon the ice by strict construction of the term. All who may,
by any reasonable construction of the word, be included within the coverage afforded by
the policy should be given its protection. If, in the application of this principle of construc-
tion, the limits of coverage slide across the slippery area and the company falls into a
1648 [Vol, 69
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application in recent North Carolina insurance holdings.3 9 Like the general
principle of strict construction, however, North Carolina courts employ the doc-
trine quite mechanically, with little if any consideration for its theoretical
basis.40
Before a court is permitted to apply any of the rules of strict construction
outlined above, it first must find a provision ambiguous.4 ' The presence of am-
biguity is a determination for the court.42 In cases involving exclusion clauses,
courts have found ambiguity in policy provisions that are substantially contra-
dictory,43 as well as in provisions that are susceptible to more than one interpre-
tation.44 In the case of contradictory provisions, courts generally have denied
effect to exclusionary language. 45 Clauses susceptible to multiple interpreta-
tions, however, have presented a host of difficult cases in which courts have
acted largely on the equities of particular situations. In York Industrial Center,
Inc. v. Michigan Mutual Liability Co.,46 for example, the court held that an
insurance policy that specifically exempted intentional destruction covered lia-
bility in trespass incurred by a developer who cleared erroneously surveyed
property.47 The court concluded that although trespass, by definition, requires
coverage somewhat more extensive than it contemplated, the fault lies in its own selection
of the words by which it chose to be bound.
Id. at 437, 146 S.E.2d at 416.
39. Eg., State Capital Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 318 N.C. 534, 542-43, 350 S.E.2d
66, 71 (1986); Maddox v. Colonial Life and Accident Ins. Co., 303 N.C. 648, 650, 280 S.E.2d 907,
908 (1981); Wilkins v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 97 N.C. App. 266, 270, 388 S.E.2d 191, 193
(1990); W & J Rives, Inc. v. Kemper Ins. Group, 92 N.C. App. 313, 317, 374 S.E.2d 430,433 (1988),
disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C. 342, 378 S.E.2d 809 (1989); Western World Ins. Co. v. Carrington, 90
N.C. App. 520, 523, 369 S.E.2d 128, 129 (1988); Graham v. James F. Jackson Assocs., Inc., 84 N.C.
App. 427, 430, 352 S.E.2d 878, 881, disc. rev. granted, 319 N.C. 458, 356 S.E.2d 4, disc. rev. with-
drawn, 321 N.C. 295, 362 S.E.2d 277 (1987).
40. See supra note 39.
41. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d
518, 522 (1970). If there is no ambiguity, "the court must enforce the contract as the parties have
made it and may not, under the guise of interpreting an ambiguous provision, remake the contract
and impose liability upon the company which it did not assume and for which the policyholder did
not pay." Id. For two recent cases that follow this rule, see Wilkins, 97 N.C. App. at 272, 388
S.E.2d at 195 and Mastrom, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 78 N.C. App. 483, 484, 337 S.E.2d
162, 163 (1985).
42. Waste Management, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 694, 340 S.E.2d 374, 379
(1986). "No ambiguity... exists unless, in the opinion of the court, the language of the policy is
fairly and reasonably susceptible to either of the constructions for which the parties contend." Id.
(quoting Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d
518, 522 (1970)).
43. See, eg., Graham, 84 N.C. App. at 430-31, 352 S.E.2d at 881 (insurer liable for coverage
when policy insured against injury resulting from assault but excluded claims arising out of any
criminal act); Southeast Airmotive Corp. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 78 N.C. App. 418, 418-20,
337 S.E.2d 167, 168-69 (1985) (insurer liable for coverage when policy covered damage to property
arising from use of aircraft but excluded damage to property carried on an aircraft), disc. rev. denied,
316 N.C. 196, 341 S.E.2d 583 (1986); Stanback v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 68 N.C. App. 107, 111-
15, 314 S.E.2d 775, 778-80 (1984) (insurer liable for coverage when policy covered personal injury,
including false arrest and false imprisonment, but excluded acts "committed... with intent to cause
personal injury").
44. See infra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 43.
46. 271 N.C. 158, 155 S.E.2d 501 (1967).
47. Id. at 159-61, 163, 155 S.E.2d at 503-04.
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an intentional act, the clearing of adjacent property did not constitute inten-
tional destruction for the purposes of the policy exemption. 48 Similarly, the
court in W & J Rives, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance Group49 construed ambiguous
policy language in favor of the insured. In that case, Rives, a manufacturer of
sportswear, had contracted with Aetna Casualty and Insurance Company for an
excess umbrella policy.50 The Aetna policy contained an exemption for prop-
erty damage "to the extent that the insured has agreed to provide [other] insur-
ance therefor."''s When a shipment of Rives' goods was stolen in 1984, the
company claimed against Aetna for the value of loss in excess of that covered by
its primary insurer, Kemper Insurance Group.5 2 Aetna denied coverage, assert-
ing that since Rives had reached an agreement with Kemper to insure the ship-
ment, Aetna's policy did not apply.5 3 The court, noting that Aetna's agent had
issued the policy pursuant to Rives' request for excess coverage for precisely the
type of shipments involved, ruled that Rives' policy with Aetna covered the un-
insured losses. 54 The exemption clause, the court held, applied only to agree-
ments with third parties such as purchasers of Rives' goods, and not to
agreements with other insurance companies."5
North Carolina courts, however, have by no means accepted assertions of
ambiguity in insurance policies whenever parties have so pleaded. Accordingly,
in Western World Insurance Co. v. Carrington,56 the court rejected arguments by
a waterproofing contractor that his general liability policy covered damages in a
suit for the costs of remediating faulty workmanship.5 7 The court held that the
policy's exclusion for "property damage to work performed by ... the named
insured arising out of the work"5 8 effectively excused the insurer, since the claim
consisted "solely for bringing the quality of the insured's work up to the stan-
dard bargained for."'5 9 Similarly, the court of appeals in Wilkins v. American
Motorists Insurance Co. 6 held that claims of failure to warn or properly instruct
persons leasing an aircraft from the insured fell within a homeowner's policy
exclusion for injuries "arising out of the ownership, maintenance [or] use.., of
... an aircraft."'6
1
As these cases suggest, the ability to determine whether ambiguity exists
has afforded courts considerable flexibility in determining the precise extent to
48. Id. at 163, 155 S.E.2d at 505-06.
49. 92 N.C. App. 313, 374 S.E.2d 430 (1988), disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C. 342, 378 S.E.2d 809
(1989).
50. Id. at 315, 374 S.E.2d at 432.
51. Id. at 316, 374 S.E.2d at 432.
52. Id. at 315, 374 S.E.2d at 432.
53. Id. at 315-16, 374 S.E.2d at 432.
54. Id. at 316-17, 374 S.E.2d at 433.
55. Id. at 317, 374 S.E.2d at 433.
56. 90 N.C. App. 520, 369 S.E.2d 128 (1988).
57. Id. at 521, 524, 369 S.E.2d at 128-29.
58. Id. at 522, 369 S.E.2d at 129.
59. Id. at 525, 369 S.E.2d at 131,
60. 97 N.C. App. 266, 388 S.E.2d 191 (1990). The opinion was handed down after Duke
University.
61. Id. at 268, 272, 388 S.E.2d at 193, 195.
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which policies of insurance protect policyholders. This flexibility, however, is
limited by the principle that even ambiguous terms must be construed in har-
mony with the express provisions of the policy and the intent of the parties. 62
Most frequently, this maxim is expressed as a refusal, "under the guise of inter-
preting an ambiguous provision, [to] remake the contract and impose liability
upon the company which it did not assume and for which the policyholder did
not pay." 63 Occasionally, however, North Carolina courts have articulated this
principle in terms of the intent of the parties as discernable through the contract.
As one court wrote: "[T]he objective of construction of terms in an insurance
policy is to arrive at the insurance coverage intended by the parties when the
policy was issued." 64
The best illustration of this intent-oriented reasoning is the North Carolina
Supreme Court's holding in Waste Management, Inc. v. Peerless Insurance Co. 65
In that case, a private trash collection company accused of depositing refuse
containing hazardous materials in a local landfill sought to compel its insurers to
defend the action.66 The insurers argued that a policy exclusion for pollution
damage exempted the underlying suit,67 which involved deposits over a six-year
62. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354-55, 172 S.E.2d
518, 522 (1970).
63. Eg., Waste Management, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co, 315 N.C. 688, 694, 340 S.E.2d 374, 379
(1986) (quoting Wachovia, 276 N.C. at 354, 172 S.E.2d at 522).
64. Wachovia, 276 N.C. at 354, 172 S.E.2d at 522. The Wachovia court went on to enumerate a
series of rules of construction to be used in gleaning the intent of the parties from the language of the
insurance contract:
When the policy contains a definition of a term used in it, this is the meaning which must
be given to that term wherever it appears in the policy, unless the context clearly requires
otherwise. In the absence of such definition, nontechnical words are to be given a meaning
consistent with the sense in which they are used in ordinary speech, unless the context
clearly requires otherwise....
Where the immediate context in which words are used is not clearly indicative of the
meaning intended, resort may be had to other portions of the policy and all clauses of it are
to be construed, if possible, so as to bring them into harmony. Each word is deemed to
have been put into the policy for a purpose and will be given effect, if that can be done by
any reasonable construction in accordance with the foregoing principles.
Id. at 354-55, 172 S.E.2d at 522 (citations omitted).
Interestingly, the clearest expression of the importance of intent is found in the opinions of
courts that originally struggled with the theoretical justification of construing a policy against the
insurer. In Bray v. Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 139 N.C. 390, 51 S.E. 922 (1905), for example,
the court wrote:
If the clause in question is ambiguously worded, so that there is any uncertainty as to its
right interpretation, or if for any reason there is doubt in our minds concerning its true
meaning, we should construe it rather against the [insurer] ... giving, ofcours legal effect
to the intention, if it can be ascertained, although it may have been imperfectly or obscurely
expressed.
Id. at 393, 51 S.E. at 923 (emphasis added).
65. 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986).
66. Id. at 689-90, 340 S.E.2d at 376-77.
67. Id. at 690, 340 S.E.2d at 376-77. The exact language of the policy was as follows:
This insurance does not apply ... to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of... toxic chemicals ... waste materials or other
... contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or
body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or
escape is sudden and accidental.
Id. at 693-94, 340 S.E.2d at 379.
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period, unless such damage resulted from a "sudden and accidental" release of
harmful materials.68 In holding that the exclusion applied, the court looked not
only to the language of the insurance contract, but also to the underlying policy
reasons for the pollution exclusion.69 In particular, the court noted that, from
the insured's perspective, coverage for pollution damage would result in a temp-
tation to "diminish ... precautions and relax ... vigilance."' 70 Conversely,
wrote the court, by "putting the financial responsibility for pollution that may
occur over the course of time upon the insured [, the policy] places the responsi-
bility to guard against such occurrences upon the party with the most control
over the circumstances most likely to cause the pollution. '7 1 The court also
noted in a footnote that at the time the policyholder purchased the insurance in
question, separate policies for "environmental impairment" were available to
supplement general liability coverage. 72 The existence of pollution coverage, the
court opined, was "enlightening concerning the underwriters' understanding of
the scope of coverage in the [general] liability policy."'73 These types of policy-
based observations, though relatively rare in North Carolina insurance jurispru-
dence, indicate the court's willingness to look beyond the mechanical application
of traditional rules of construction to more subtle indications regarding the in-
tent of parties and the meaning of policy language.
Compared to the large amount of North Carolina case law addressing con-
struction of insurance policies, authority regarding the nature of the term "pro-
fessional services" is quite limited.74 Indeed, the court in Duke University found
68. See id. at 690, 696-700, 340 S.E.2d at 376, 380-83. The insurers also argued that the routine
dumping of waste materials alleged in the underlying suit was not an "occurrence" for the purposes
of the policies involved. Id. at 695-96, 340 S.E.2d at 379-80. The court disagreed. Id. at 696, 340
S.E.2d at 380.
69. See id. at 697-98, 340 S.E.2d at 381.
70. Id. at 698, 340 S.E.2d at 381.
71. Id. The full language of the court's observation is as follows:
The policy reasons for the pollution exclusion are obvious: if an insured kmows that liabil-
ity incurred by all manner of negligence or careless spills and releases is covered by his
liability policy, he is tempted to diminish his precautions and relax his vigilance. Relaxed
vigilance is even more likely where the insured knows that the intentional deposit of toxic
material in his dumpsters, so long as it is unexpected, affords him coverage. In this case, it
pays the insured to keep his head in the sand.
From the insurer's perspective, the practical reasons for the pollution exclusion are
likewise clear: the lessons of Love Canal and sites like it have revealed the yawning extent
of potential liability arising from the gradual or repeated discharge of hazardous substances
into the environment. In addition, putting the financial responsibility for pollution that
may occur over the course of time upon the insured places the responsibility to guard
against such occurrences upon the party with the most control over the circumstances
most likely to cause the pollution.
Id. at 697-98, 340 S.E.2d at 381.
72. Id. at 698 n.5, 340 S.E.2d at 381 n.5.
73. Id.
74. Although a number of North Carolina statutes use the term "professional service," few
have resulted in litigation specifically addressing the term. The few cases that have addressed the
term provide little guidance for the purposes of this analysis. Two courts have refused to find the
term unconstitutionally vague. In State v. Covington, 34 N.C. App. 457, 238 S.E.2d 794 (1977),
disc rev. denied, 294 N.C. 184, 241 S.E.2d 519 (1978), the court concluded that a statute defining the
"practice of professional engineering" as "any professional service ... requiring engineering educ-
tion... and the application of special knowledge of the mathematical, physical and engineering
sciences," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89-2(6) (1965) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT, § 89C-3(6)
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its definitional authority for the term in Smith v. Keator,75 a case wholly unre-
lated to insurance law. In Smith a group of masseurs operating in Fayetteville
sought to avoid local licensing requirements by arguing that state law gave the
North Carolina Commissioner of Revenue sole authority to license practitioners
of any "professional art of healing." 76 The court held that masseurs could not
be classified as professionals.77 A professional service, it wrote, "'is one arising
out of a vocation, calling, occupation, or employment involving specialized
knowledge, labor, or skill, and the labor of [sic] skill involved is predominantly
mental or intellectual, rather than physical or manual.' "178 This definition is
substantially identical to that reported by Appleman,79 who notes further that
"[m]ere employment, even though on a compensated basis, does not of itself
render the person employed a 'professional' in that particular field." 80
North Carolina law has been the basis for two holdings regarding the na-
ture of professional services for the purposes of malpractice insurance. In Mas-
trom, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., s1 an accounting firm that had
recommended investment in one of its financially troubled clients sought cover-
age for its liability in fraud.8 2 The court held that investment advising could not
be brought within the firm's coverage for "damages... arising out of the per-
(1989)), was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to an engineer accused of practicing engineering
without registering as required by statute. Covington, 34 N.C. App. at 460-61, 238 S.E.2d at 797. In
Roberts v. Durham County Hosp. Corp., 56 N.C. App. 533, 289 S.E.2d 875 (1982), aff'd per
curiam, 307 N.C. 465, 298 S.E.2d 384 (1983), a statute establishing a period of limitations for "mal-
practice arising out of the performance of or failure to perform professional services," N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983), was held not to be unconstitutionally vague as applied to a doctor who failed
to remove an intravenous catheter after rendering care. Roberts, 56 N.C. App. at 538-41, 289 S.E.2d
at 878-80.
Two cases involving North Carolina's unfair and deceptive trade practice statute, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 75-1.1 (1988), have interpreted a professional services exemption in that law rather broadly.
In Cameron v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp., Inc., 58 N.C. App. 414, 293 S.E.2d 901, disc rev.
denied, 307 N.C. 127, 297 S.E.2d 399 (1982), the court held that the statute's exemption for "profes-
sional services rendered by a member of a learned profession," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b), ex-
empted doctors who, as members of a hospital administrative board, voted to deny staff privileges to
a podiatrist. Cameron, 58 N.C. App. at 446-47, 293 S.E.2d at 920-21. The court concluded that
"the nature of this consideration of whom to grant hospital staff privileges is a necessary assurance of
good health care; certainly, this is the rendering of 'professional services.'" Id. at 447, 293 S.E.2d at
921. Similarly, the court held in Abram v. Charter Medical Corp., 100 N.C. App. 718, 398 S.E.2d
331 (1990), that a drug rehabilitation services provider who requested a review of a competitor's
certificate-of-need application was acting as a responsible provider of professional services and thus
outside the scope of the statute. Id. at 722, 398 S.E.2d at 334. But cf Winston Realty Co. v.
G.H.G., Inc., 70 N.C. App. 374, 375-76, 382, 320 S.E.2d 286, 287-88, 291 (1984) (employment agent
who recommended convicted embezzler for accounting position was not rendering professional serv-
ices for purposes of professional services exemption in unfair and deceptive trade practices statute),
aff'd, 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985).
75. 21 N.C. App. 102, 203 S.E.2d 411, aff'd, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203, appeal dismissed,
419 U.S. 1043 (1974).
76. Id. at 103, 105, 203 S.E.2d at 413, 415; see N.C. GEM. STAT. § 105-41(a) (1989) (amended
1990).
77. Smith, 21 N.C. App. at 105-06, 203 S.E.2d at 415.
78. Id. (quoting Marx v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 183 Neb. 12, 14, 157 N.W.2d 870,
872 (1968)).
79. 7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4504.01, at 309-10 (W. Berdal ed.
1979).
80. Id. § 4501.12 at 282-83.
81. 78 N.C. App. 483, 337 S.E.2d 162 (1985).
82. Id. at 483-84, 337 S.E.2d at 163.
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formance of professional services... as an accountant. '8 3 Similarly, in Smith v.
Travelers Indemnity Co.,8 4 a federal district court found that an attorney's pro-
fessional malpractice policy did not cover his failure to return $15,000 given to
him for investment.85 Noting that no attorney-client relationship had been es-
tablished at the time the lawyer received the money, the court concluded that
the plaintiff had not employed the attorney "for the purposes of obtaining any
legal assistance."'8 6 The transaction, therefore, was outside the coverage of the
malpractice policy.8
7
The second element of the Duke University court's definition of professional
services-the rule that the nature of the act rather than the title or character of
the actor should determine the presence of such services-is new to North Caro-
lina law. While at least three other jurisdictions have applied this rule,88 each
has done so in a largely mechanical fashion, with no discussion of underlying
rationale or purpose.8 9
Fundamental to an understanding of the holding in Duke University is a
careful analysis of the types of activities that the term "professional services"
may encompass. Relevant activities can be grouped into two categories. First
are services that even the narrowest definition of the term will embrace. These
are acts informed by special knowledge.90 Examples include a surgeon's selec-
tion of an incision site, a lawyer's drafting of a will, and an accountant's classifi-
cation of expenses for bookkeeping purposes. The second, much broader,
category of services consists of those actions that, though not arising directly
from some specially informed judgment, are associated so closely with the per-
83. Id. at 484-85, 337 S.E.2d at 163. The court concluded: "Nowhere do we find any definition
of 'accountant' broad enough to include the sale of securities, nor any definition of 'accountant' as
one who offers a general range of financial services." Id. at 485, 337 S.E.2d at 164.
84. 343 F. Supp. 605 (M.D.N.C. 1972).
85. Id. at 605-06, 610.
86. Id. at 609.
87. Id. at 609-10. The terms of the professional malpractice at issue involved provided for
insurance for claims "arising out of the performance of professional services for others in the in-
sured's capacity as a lawyer." Id. at 608.
88. See Mason v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 370 F.2d 925, 926 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (court
applying Louisiana law held that claim by infirmary patient for injuries received from hypodermic
injection administered by student nurse was within professional services exclusion of general liability
policy); Danks v. Maher, 177 So. 2d 412, 417-18 (La. App. 1965) (claim by patient injured when
hospital nurse failed to count accurately laparotomy sponges removed from patient undergoing ab-
dominal surgery was not within professional services exclusion of hospital's general liability policy);
D'Antoni v. Sara Mayo Hosp., 144 So. 2d 643, 646-47 (La. App. 1962) (claim by patient injured in
fall from bed after hospital attendants failed to raise bed rails was not within professional services
exclusion of hospital's general liability policy); Marx v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 183 Neb.
12, 14, 157 N.W.2d 870, 872 (1968) (when fire resulted from laboratory technician's refilling steam
sterilizer with benzene, court concluded that damages were not excluded by a general liability policy
exclusion for the rendering of professional services); Multnomah County v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co.,
256 Or. 24, 28-29, 470 P.2d 147, 150 (1970) (inmate's claim of failure to provide necessary medical
treatment against county jailer within professional services exclusion of general liability policy).
89. See supra note 88. Appleman reports the rule without comment. 7A J. APPLEMAN, supra
note 79, § 4504.01, at 310 ("[I]n determining whether a particular act is a 'professional service' the
court must look not to the title or character of the party performing the act, but to the act itself.").
90. See Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 639, 386 S.E.2d at 765. Although the definition of
professional services used in the principal case is more complex and precise, see id., this Note uses




formance of informed services that they are arguably professional in character.
Activities within this second category can be ordered according to the strength
of their association with acts in the first category. For example, when a surgeon
fails to remove an instrument from a patient before closure, the mechanical act
of inventorying instruments or recognizing that one has been left in the patient
requires no special skill or knowledge, yet it seems likely that even the most
conservative of courts would classify such an action as a failure to render a
professional service. On the opposite end of the spectrum are actions that are
only loosely associated with the furnishing of a service requiring special skill or
knowledge. Maintenance of a doctor's office premises, for example, may well
constitute an action so remote from the application of specialized knowledge as
to render meaningless any assertion that it is professional in character.
In interpreting professional service exclusion clauses, there is a temptation
to assert that only those activities classified within the first category above-
actions informed by some special skill or knowledge-should be deemed to fall
within the exclusion language. Indeed, this is one possible interpretation of the
holding in Duke University. Specifically, the court observed that stabilizing the
dialysis chair and assisting the patient did "not require any special skills or
training."91 In its strictest sense, this statement would exclude almost any act
not informed by some special knowledge or skill.
Most likely, however, the Duke University court concluded only that the
acts and omissions at issue in the case could not be classified without ambiguity.
This determination, in turn, required a decision in favor of the insured, since the
applicable rules of construction demand that any ambiguity be resolved against
the insurer. This interpretation of the holding is supported by the court's obser-
vation that "the claim in this case could come within [a professional liability
policy] and yet not fall within a professional services exclusion." 92 Indeed, this
notion that a single claim may be susceptible to coverage under both general and
professional liability policies suggests that the court tacitly recognized that cer-
tain professional services may be classified along a spectrum according to the
strength of their association with actions which are truly informed by special
skill and knowledge.
While both the above modes of analysis achieve results commensurate with
North Carolina insurance jurisprudence, there is little to recommend either. If
professional services are restricted exclusively to actions informed by special
knowledge, general liability insurance will cover a whole range of activities
closely associated with informed actions, but not themselves requiring special
knowledge, regardless of the applicable policy's exclusionary language. While
the opinion in Duke University does not require this result, its largely mechanical
analysis does little to dissuade future courts from this interpretation.
The second interpretation of the court's holding also presents important
difficulties. By its express terms, the opinion institutionalizes an overlap be-
tween general liability policies, the exclusionary clauses of which must be con-
91. Id. at 641, 386 S.E.2d at 766.
92. Id. at 640, 386 S.E.2d at 765.
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strued narrowly, and professional services liability policies, which must be
construed broadly.93 This overlap is likely to encourage litigation between com-
peting insurers as they attempt to apportion liability with regard to actions that
are covered under two policies. Policyholders, in contrast, will be encouraged to
use any overlap in experience-rated policies to file claims under less expensive
general liability policies, thus shifting the cost of insuring the particular activity
away from populations most able to limit the risk involved. Finally, the overlap
will hamper efforts by insurance providers to classify activities according to the
nature of the risk involved and to set premiums accordingly.
The court in Duke University could have reduced the potential overlap be-
tween general liability and professional services policies by broadening its analy-
sis to consider the intent of the parties and the underlying theory of the policy
provisions at issue as a means of reducing ambiguity in the term "professional
services." In particular, the court failed to note that most insurance companies
attempt to maximize profitability by grouping policyholders into categories that
share common risks.94 Classification allows insurers to measure accurately the
costs of insuring risks and to price policies, copayments, and deductibles in a
manner that maximizes both risk avoidance and risk protection. 95 Furthermore,
accurate classification serves important societal interests by placing the burden
of insuring a risk on those persons most able to protect against it.96
As suggested earlier, judicial consideration of these principles of risk alloca-
tion and insurance economics is not without precedent. In Waste Management,
Inc. v. Peerless Insurance Co. 97 the North Carolina Supreme Court, looking to
what it termed "policy reasons,"9 8 gave considerable weight to the fact that the
pollution exclusion at issue encouraged policyholders to "guard against" the
pollution risk. 99 The Waste Management court noted that the exclusion was
entirely consistent with the insurer's perception of the "yawning extent" of the
potential liability involvedi ° ° and the availability of special forms of insurance to
93. See id.
94. K. ABRAHAM, DISRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
15 (1986).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 138. Of course, insurance may serve a distributional function as well. The whole
point of insurance is to enable a single individual to avoid the entire risk for a particular activity. See
id. at 18. In virtually all cases, insurers' inability to predict risk for particular individuals perfectly,
combined with the cost of information gathering, prevents classification of insureds into groups so
small that the distributive benefit of insurance is lost. Id. at 15.
Some commentators have suggested that an appropriate function of insurance law is to assure
that risk classification by insurers does not inappropriately limit the socially desirable goal of risk
distribution. See id. at 18-31. A discussion of the appropriateness of judicial interpretation of pri-
vate contracts of insurance for risk distribution purposes is beyond the scope of this Note. It should
be noted, however, that the court in Duke University made no express or implied reference to this
objective. Further, while the ever increasing cost of health care insurance may provide an argument
that broader risk distribution is appropriate for professional services in the field of health care, the
policy adopted by the court in Duke University would appear to apply to all forms of professional
service, inside and outside the health care arena. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
97. 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986).
98. Id. at 697, 340 S.E.2d at 381.
99. Id. at 697-98, 340 S.E.2d at 381.
100. Id. at 698, 340 S.E.2d at 381.
[Vol. 691656
INSURANCE LAW
cover the specific risk. 10 1
Similar arguments can be made regarding professional services coverage.
Specifically, when a particular action is related closely to some action informed
by special skill or knowledge, the risks associated with the action are likely to be
peculiarly within the control of the actor in his capacity as a professional.
Under the theory that the costs of insuring risks should be borne by those most
able to control the risk, such actions should be insured under professional serv-
ices insurance policies rather than under contracts of general liability insurance.
Alternatively, when a particular action is only loosely associated with the ren-
dering of some specially informed service or skill, the risks associated with the
action are more likely to be within the control of the actor as a member of
society in general. In other words, the risks associated with the action are not
disproportionately within the actor's control in his capacity as a professional.
Such acts are, therefore, most appropriately insured under general liability
coverage.
Notably, this mode of analysis is consistent with the rule that the nature of
an act and not the title or position of the actor is determinative with respect to
the presence of professional services. Looking to the title of an actor gives no
indication of whether the particular action at issue is peculiarly within her con-
trol as a professional. To build on an example already suggested, a doctor's
liability for failure to maintain safe premises is not closely related to the medical
profession, but rises from a duty common to owners of business premises as a
whole. The risk and liability are not closely related to the doctor's skill or learn-
ing, nor disproportionately within her control as a professional.
Applying the suggested analysis to the facts in Duke University, it is clear
that the court, though failing to recognize the intent of the parties as a factor in
construing the policy at issue, ultimately arrived at a result consistent with such
an analysis. As the court intuitively concluded, the failure to fix the casters on
the patient's dialysis chair was not an omission uniquely or disproportionately
associated with the providing of skilled health care. The court suggested in its
closing analysis:
Although the dialysis chair was a specialized piece of equipment, the
injury was not related to any special function of the chair but merely
resulted from the presence of casters on the chair which enable it to be
easily moved. The injury may have been avoided by simply locking the
casters or holding the chair.102
As this statement suggests, much the same risk is found in the failure of any
business operator to safely use and maintain equipment on his premises. In this
light, the failure to lock the casters was not an action informed by special knowl-
edge, nor so closely related to the employment of specially informed judgment as
to be disproportionately associated with the provision of health care.
Finally, although Duke University presents the problem of analyzing profes-
sional liability exclusions in terms of the health care profession, the question is
101. Id. at 698 n.5, 340 S.E.2d at 381 n.5.
102. Duke University, 96 N.C. App. at 641, 386 S.E.2d at 766.
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by no means unique to that field. Cases in other jurisdictions have addressed the
problem in the context of engineering firms,103 barbers and beauticians, 1t 4 and
hotel operations.10 5 One innovative insurer has even suggested that a profes-
sional services exclusion apply to babysitting in the home.10 6 Indeed, the prob-
lem is likely to arise in any professional area in which insurance companies offer
or limit protection for professional liability.
Although the mode of analysis suggested by this Note may be applied to
any of these fields, the classification scheme it proposes certainly is not without
ambiguity. Close cases will continue to pose difficult choices. But consideration
of the economic and risk allocation objectives of policy exclusions, and in partic-
ular the need to place the cost of insurance on those most able to prevent the
injury insured, would provide a useful guidepost for jurists. Further, such con-
siderations would serve as an appropriate balance to the well-established goal of
protecting the insured against unfair and ambiguous policy language.
North Carolina has joined other jurisdictions in holding that courts should
resolve ambiguities in contracts of insurance in favor of the insured. 10 7 This
canon of construction, which opinions of early courts grounded solidly in the
need to protect policyholders from the "slippery" wording of complex and tech-
nical contracts, is now a fixture of modem insurance jurisprudence. Yet, in
many respects, contemporary application of the rule has become largely
mechanical. Such was the case in Duke University, where the North Carolina
Court of Appeals narrowly construed a general liability policy exclusion for pro-
fessional services. While the Duke University court's result arguably is correct,
the opinion fails to articulate a rationale that will guide future courts in resolv-
ing similar disputes over the status of professional services exclusion claims.
Further, by openly acknowledging that current rules of construction create an
area of overlap between general liability and professional services coverages, the
103. See ag., First Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 466 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1972) (engineer-
ing drawings requiring earthen fill which damaged oil pipeline constituted failure of professional
services for purposes of contractor's general liability policy exclusion); Womack v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 251 So. 2d 463 (La. App. 1971) (engineering firm's failure to confirm drawings showing location
of gas pipeline was professional malpractice within general liability policy exclusion); Atlantic Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Continental Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 123 N.J. Super. 241, 302 A.2d 177 (1973) (failure of
engineering firm to properly oversee trench fortification was failure to render professional services
excluded by general liability policy).
104. See, eg., Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Herzberg's Inc., 100 F.2d 171 (8th Cir.)
(beautician's negligent use of electrical depilator was failure of professional services for purposes of
exclusion in department store's general liability policy), cert denied, 306 U.S. 645 (1939); Ruotolo v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 56 Misc. 2d 45, 287 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1968) (barber who hit customer in
eye with whisk broom not rendering tonsorial services for purposes of exclusion in general liability
policy); Lady Beautiful, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 16 Ohio Misc. 169, 240 N.E.2d 894 (1968) (beauty
parlor patron's injuries from faulty hair dryer not a result of acts or omissions excluded by profes-
sional services clause of general liability policy).
105. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Crazy Water Co., 160 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942)
(hotel patron's injuries in bath prescribed by hotel physician and attended by hotel "tubber" (one
who draws the bathwater, checks the water temperature, and otherwise assists a bather) not ex-
cluded by professional services clause of general liability policy).
106. See Gulf Ins. Co. v. Tilley, 280 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Ind. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 393 F.2d
119 (7th Cir. 1968).
107. See Grabbs v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 125 N.C. 389, 34 S.E. 503 (1899); supra text
accompanying note 1.
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opinion encourages future litigation and impedes insurers' abilities to classify
and price insurance policies covering risks related to professional services accu-
rately. These difficulties will continue until North Carolina courts begin to con-
sider systematically the underlying nature of insurance contracts and the
importance of accurate risk allocation in interpreting and coordinating the in-
surance of professional services.
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